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Abstract 
The September 11th event focused the world’s attention on the threat 
of bioterrorism on the food chain. As a consequence, the USA. 
implemented the Bioterrorism Act (BTA) containing new import 
requirements that can be classified as non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
This paper analyses these NTBs by performing an assessment of 
WTO conformity and trade impact: hereby general problems in the 
analysis of bioterrorist risks are explored as for this new and 
unknown threat explicit WTO rules are still missing. Additionally, in 
exploring the BTA relevant process standard rules laid out by the 
WTO, the analysis indicates the extensive flexibility provided in this 
framework. This leads to larger scope for national polices on pro-
cess standards compared to product standards (e.g. residua levels). 
The empirical trade flow analysis illustrates differences in the 
compliance costs between countries. This differentiation can be 
caused by learning costs that may differ among countries. The 
analysis highlights that perishable products and countries with 
small import quantities are mostly affected. 
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Zusammenfassung  
Durch den Terroranschlag vom 11. September 2001 wurde dem Risiko 
bioterroristischer Attacken auf die Lebensmittelkette neue Aufmerk-
samkeit zuteil. Die USA verabschiedeten als Reaktion den “Bio-
terrorism Act” (BTA), der neue Importregelungen formuliert, die als 
nicht-tarifäre Maßnahmen (NTBs) bezeichnet werden können. Der 
vorliegende Artikel analysiert diese NTBs hinsichtlich ihrer Konfor-
mität mit WTO-Regeln und ihrer Handelseffekte: Hierbei zeigen sich 
grundsätzliche Probleme für die Beurteilung bioterroristischer Risi-
ken als neue und bislang unbekannte Bedrohung für die explizite 
WTO-Regeln fehlen. Weiterhin wird die große Flexibilität deutlich, 
die die WTO im Bereich von Prozessstandards, zu denen die BTA-
Regelungen zählen, gewährt. Hieraus resultiert ein größerer natio-
naler Spielraum der Politikgestaltung bei Prozessstandards im Ver-
gleich zu Produktstandards (z.B. Grenzwerte für Rückstände). Die 
empirische Analyse der Handelsströme verdeutlicht unterschied-
liche Kosten der Anpassung an die neuen BTA-Regeln in einzelnen 
Ländern. Diese Unterschiede können begründet sein durch national 
unterschiedliche Lernkosten. Die Analyse zeigt auf, dass leicht ver-
derbliche Produkte und Länder mit geringen Importmengen am 
stärksten betroffen sind.  
Schlüsselwörter 
Bioterrorismus; nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse; Handelserleichte-
rung; Bioterrorismus-Gesetz; Lebensmittelhandel; SPS-Abkommen 
1. Introduction 
As a response to September 11
th, the U.S. implemented 
several security measures to ensure the safety of U.S. infra-
structure and the food chain. To address this new threat, 
current food safety and security systems have been bol-
stered and new regulatory authorities created. Furthermore, 
several new legislative acts shall help to reduce the vulner-
ability of the U.S. to terrorism. One of these measures is the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 (“THE BIOTERRORISM ACT”, BTA, 
CONGRESS OF THE U.S., 2002), entering into force Decem-
ber 12, 2003. 
After the notification of the BTA as a sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measure to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the European Union (EU) as well as several other countries 
raised concerns about the widespread trade impacts and 
costs of this regulation for imports (WTO, 2003): the main 
objections referred to the scientific justification of the im-
port requirements and the potential discrimination of for-
eign companies over U.S. companies. Even though no dis-
pute settlement procedure was initiated, smoothness of 
trade seems not to be satisfying as the BTA is still a point 
on the agenda of meetings of several organizations (e.g. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004). 
National food law focuses on the prevention of unintentio-
nal pest introduction or food adulteration
1; however, since 
the events of September 11
th, the threat of intentional food, 
crop, or livestock manipulation is at the centre of interest. 
These intentional manipulations are captured under the term 
bioterrorism and are defined as “the threat or use of bio-
logical agents [to cause harm] by individuals or groups 
motivated by political, religious, ecological, or other ideo-
logical objectives” (MEYERSON  and  REASER, 2002: 593; 
following CARUS, 2001: 3). Food terrorism specifically is 
defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as “an 
act or threat of deliberate contamination of food for human 
consumption with chemical, biological or radionuclear 
agents for the purpose of causing injury or death to civilian 
                                                    
1    For instance, New Zealand adopted its general Biosecurity 
Strategy in 2003 and the EU’s new General Food Law was 
amended in 2003. Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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populations and/or disrupting social, economic or political 
stability” (WHO, 2002: 8). However, both definitions have 
in common that the wilful harm of humans or assets is the 
distinction between (bio-) terrorism and accidental outbreak 
of crop or livestock diseases or foodborne illnesses.
2 This 
analysis is based on a slightly modified WHO definition 
since we only focus on food terrorism resulting from bio-
logical agents.  
Administrative, information related import regulations as 
those addressed by the BTA are examples of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs). NTBs can be defined as “any device or 
practice other than a tariff which directly impedes the entry 
of imports into a country” (HILLMAN, 1991: 8) as for e-
xample quantitative restrictions, technical regulations re-
garding product and process standards, and labeling or 
packing requirements. Administrative import requirements 
may hinder trade because of data and documentation de-
mands, a lack of transparency on requirements and audit-
based controls, a high degree of unpredictability, and a lack 
of automatization of procedures or co-operation between 
agencies (NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, 2002). 
Studies on methodology and analysis of NTBs and the 
effects of trade facilitation have increased in the recent past, 
however, empirical and quantitative measurement of NTBs 
is still facing difficulties. Due to the heterogeneity of such 
measures comprehensive studies on general methods are 
limited (OECD, 2003a), and most often they are focusing 
on certain sectors or selected types of NTB groups (OECD, 
2003a). In particular, studies that quantify the impact of 
import regimes are very rare or use data that is rather old. 
However, a comprehensive OECD study (OECD, 2002) 
summarizes the results of existing studies on the quantifica-
tion of the costs of trade regimes, and identified the potenti-
al relevance of those measures: a cost range of 2% to 15% 
of the trade transaction value is assessed depending on 
covered cost components and methodological approaches 
(OECD, 2002: 12).  
The objective of this paper is to provide an introduction on 
scope and impact of the very recently implemented admin-
istrative NTBs in the BTA. First, we systemize the BTA 
provisions within the relevant WTO framework based on a 
qualitative inventory approach (MOENIUS, 1999; HENSON et 
al., 2000; OTSUKI et al., 2001a) and subsequently, an evalua-
tion of the measures regarding conformity with the WTO 
principles of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agree-
ment takes place. Finally, to show potential trade impacts of 
the legislation we provide evidence on the development of 
the import pattern of food imports before and after the BTA 
implementation. Our analysis has an explorative character 
given that in the area of probability and damage assessment 
of food terrorism acts, and information-related, administra-
tive NTBs only limited research has been done and the 
framework for conformity analysis and measurement is not 
clearly defined yet. 
                                                    
2   Some authors also use the term agroterrorism when referring 
to the specific risks agricultural production and the food chain 
are exposed to. 
2. Import rules under the Bioterrorism Act 
The objective of the Bioterrorism Act is “to improve the 
ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and 
respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies” 
(preamble of the BTA) by providing additional information 
and action tools to the administration.
3 The relevant rules 
for food products
4 cover the following four provisions:  
1.  Administrative detention of food is possible
5 when 
“credible evidence or information indicating that such 
article presents a threat of serious adverse health conse-
quences or death to humans or animals” (Section 303) is 
given. Furthermore, authorities are allowed to debar 
persons or firms from imports into the U.S. when they 
repeatedly violate the import regulations set out in this 
act (Section 304). 
2.  Registration of food facilities and determination of an 
agent is required (Section 305): This provision requires 
domestic and foreign facilities that manufacture/process, 
pack, or hold food for human or animal consumption in 
the U.S. to register with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA). Domestic facilities must register whether or 
not their food enters interstate commerce, foreign facili-
ties must additionally designate a U.S. agent that can be 
any entity or individual person who lives or maintains a 
business place in the U.S. and is physically present in 
the U.S.
6  
3.  Establishment and maintenance of records is required 
(Section 306). All domestic firms that manufacture, 
process, pack, distribute, receive, hold, or import food 
must establish and maintain a record keeping system. 
This measure applies to all foreign persons that trans-
port food into the U.S. or place food directly in contact 
with its finished container.
7 Source and recipient of all 
food items must be recorded including address, type of 
food, brand, variety, type of packaging, and receive and 
delivery date. Records must be kept for six month to 
two years, depending on the nature of the food item, and 
must be accessible within 24 hours.  
                                                    
3    The act in full can be found on the following web page: 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/. Additionally, the FDA 
maintains a separate web side with all relevant information on 
the BTA legislation and implementation    
(http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/bioact.html).  
4   “Protecting Safety and Security of Food and Drug Supply” is 
Title III of the BTA. Another relevant title in the following 
analysis is Title II “Enhancing Controls on Dangerous Bio-
logical Agents and Toxins” aiming at the control of domestic 
laboratories using certain agents and toxins. 
5   The term food in this regulation generally refers to the defini-
tion as provided by Section 201(f) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetics Act (FD&C Act). It includes all food and beve-
rages for human and animal consumption including chewing 
gum and all items used for components of any such article.  
6   All facilities regulated exclusively by the United States De-
partments of Agriculture (USDA) and private residences of 
individuals with food manufacturing or storage capacities, 
farms, restaurants, retail food establishments, non-profit food 
establishments, and fishing vessels are excluded. 
7   Exclusions apply again to the group of facilities listed in the 
registration provision. Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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4.  Mandatory prior notice of food shipments (Section 307) 
implies that all food items that are imported into the 
U.S. must be notified within a time frame, depending on 
the mode of transportation, of maximum five days and 
minimum 2-8 hours prior to arrival with information 
containing article specification, the manufacturer and 
shipper, the grower (if known within the specified time 
in which notice is required), the country of origin, the 
country from which the article is shipped, and the an-
ticipated port of entry. An inadequate notice leads to 
import refusal or detention.
8  
Whether these rules are applicable to a specific product 
depends on the respective institutional competence (FDA or 
USDA) and only products under the responsibility of the 
FDA are affected by the new rules. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the most important import requirements that 
were in place prior to the BTA.
9 The previously enforced 
so-called “general import procedure” was easier especially 
in terms of the notification time frame for entry of food 
                                                    
8   Excluded from this requirement are items for personal use and 
gifts, products under USDA jurisdiction, and food that was 
made by an individual in the personal residence and enters the 
U.S. for non-business reasons.  
9   The basic reference for product and admissibility standards is 
the FD&C Act, but there exist numerous other laws that regu-
late the production and marketing of food products (e.g. Fair 
Packaging and Label Act). Further information can be found 
in FAS (2001). 
shipments, the registration of food facilities, and the record 
keeping obligations. According to this former system, the 
FDA received the information up to several days after arri-
val, implying that the food may have already been delivered 
to the ultimate consignee (FR 68, Vol. 197: 58976).  
However, some product categories faced more detailed 
import requirements already prior to the BTA enforcement 
and therefore the BTA does not lead to a stronger import 
protocol for these products. Depending on the category, 
these requirements consist of a registration of the food 
facility and specific product information that had to be filed 
with arrival at the port (low-acid canned products), obtain-
ing of import permits prior to shipment (alcoholic bever-
ages, fruit and vegetables, dairy products), or having a food 
safety control system (e.g. HACCP) in the production facil-
ity in place (seafood, live fish). The import permits were 
issued for the complete firm and kept valid for up to five 
years (e.g. fruits and vegetables). Therefore, for some prod-
ucts the provisions of the BTA do not alter very much from 
already existing procedures (e.g. canned products), whereas 
for most other products (e.g. alcoholic beverages, fruit and 
vegetables, seafood, other food items) larger changes were 
initiated and relate to the above described information re-
quirements and the timeliness of the import process.
10  
                                                    
10   Note that the requirements related to obtain import permits or 
inspection certificates are still in place.  
Table 1.   Changes in the import requirements for specific food categories due to the BTA 
Product group  Basic legislation  Provisions in place prior to BTA  
supplementing the general import rules 
Stronger provisions 
in BTA 
Food categories not covered by the BTA (USDA authority) 
Meat, poultry and 
eggs 
Federal Meat Inspection Act 
Poultry Products Inspection Act 
Egg Products Inspection Act 
Equivalence of food safety system  
Inspection and approval of foreign facility  
Firm-related import permit 
Inspection at port-of-entry  
not applicable 




Low-Acid Canned Food program 
Registration of food facility 





Federal Alcohol Administration Act 
Firm-related import permit  (+) 
Fresh fruit and 
vegetable 
FD&C Act  Inspection certificate 
Firm-related import permit 
(+) 
Dairy products  FD&C Act 
Federal Import Milk Act 
Firm-related import permit 
Quota system 
(+) 
Seafood and live 
fish 
FD&C Act 
Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary 
Processing and Importing of Fish  
and Fishery Products 
HACCP system must be in place and verified 
by foreign government inspection authority 
or  
Equivalence or compliance agreement with 
the U.S. 
(+) 
Other food items 
(e.g. pasta) 
FD&C Act   No specific requirements  (++) 
Note:   For alcoholic beverages, the Bureau of Alcoholic, Tobacco and Firearms is administering the Federal Alcohol Administration Act.  
()   indicates no or only minor changes due to the BTA provisions. 
(+)   indicates stronger provisions in the BTA in terms of prior notice, record keeping, and detention. 
(++)   indicates stronger provisions in the BTA with respect to all four provisions. 
Source: own compilation based on information from FDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Foreign Agricultural 
Service (FAS), Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), Government Accountability Office (GAO) Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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The group of “other food items” faces the most drastic 
changes due to the BTA implementation as formerly no 
special requirements in addition to the general import pro-
cedures was in force. Depending on the ability of firms to 
adjust to these new components in the import protocols, this 
may lead to product and country specific trade impacts. 
3. WTO conformity assessment 
WTO disputes on NTBs and in particular trade facilitation 
measures gain increasing relevance.
11 A WTO compliance 
evaluation of an import regime may not only avoid exten-
sive dispute activities but also improve the design of such 
measures. Since the BTA has been notified to the WTO 
under the SPS Agreement
12, our analysis focuses on the 
food safety related trade provisions as covered by this 
agreement, but it is important to note that there are several 
other WTO Agreements that may be relevant for trade re-
gimes and bioterrorism.
13 
3.1 The food safety specific framework for the con-
formity assessment: The SPS Agreement  
The overall objective of the SPS Agreement is to minimize 
the trade effects of SPS measures without prejudice to the 
sovereign right of members to define a national protection 
level (JOSLING et al., 2004: 37). The specific rules selected 
for the following conformity assessment can be interpreted 
as core provisions since most of the food safety related 
disputes referred to them (RUDLOFF, 2005). The first set of 
rules targets at the appropriate protection level chosen by a 
country whereas the second set is linked to the specific 
measure used to enforce the protection level at the border 
(WTO, 1994): 
1.  The appropriate level of protection should be based on 
risk assessment considering an evaluation of probability 
and damage (Art. 5). Harmonization of these protection 
levels is targeted by the WTO recommendation to apply 
international standards that deemed to be scientifically 
necessary (Art. 3). The relevant international organisa-
tion developing food standards is the Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission (CAC). If a WTO member pursues 
stricter standards
14, this deviation from harmonization 
has to be justified by a risk assessment (Art. 3, par. 3). 
2.  Border measures to enforce the protection level should 
ensure non-discrimination and national treatment (Art. 2, 
par. 3) which refer to both equal treatment of imports 
from different members and equal treatment of imported 
and domestically produced goods. Additionally, the 
                                                    
11   Out of 328 cases initiated after 1995 more than 60 refer to the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the SPS 
Agreement, the two relevant agreements for NTBs (RUDLOFF, 
2005). 
12   See e.g. G/SPS/N/USA/690 (prior notice). 
13   For instance the “Agreement on Preshipment Inspections” or 
the “Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures”. Other ex-
plicitly security motivated rules are addressed in the GATT 
Article XXI saying “that no country shall be prevent from tak-
ing action to its essential security interests”. 
14   So far no case on lower standards has been opened, therefore 
we always refer to a deviation from international standards in 
terms of stricter standards (RUDLOFF, 2005). 
equivalence principle (Art. 4) is recommended, i.e. ac-
cept measures of the exporting countries if they achieve 
the same protection level. The exporting country has to 
proof that its varying measure is able to achieve the pro-
tection level of the importing country. Members shall 
establish bilateral agreements to recognize equivalence. 
Least-trade distortion of measures is the dominating ar-
gument in WTO food disputes (RUDLOFF, 2005). A 
measure is seen as not more trade-restrictive than neces-
sary unless there is another measure that is less trade-
restrictive but achieves the same level of protection 
(Art. 5, par. 6 and footnote 3). No defined classification 
of least-trade distorting measures exists and evaluation 
proceeds on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, techni-
cal and economic feasibility should be considered when 
evaluating the trade effect of a measure (Art. 5, par. 6). 
3.2 Evaluation of BTA provisions 
The following chapters apply the SPS frame to the BTA 
provisions in order to indicate potential scope for con- 
flicts.  
3.2.1 The appropriate level of protection –  
The problem of assessing bioterrorist risks 
The scientific justification of a measure by providing re-
sults of a risk assessment is the starting point of the SPS 
Agreement. Risk assessment is defined as the process of 
determining the probability and the extent of the adverse 
effects, i.e. damage assessment (HOOD et al., 2001: 3) for 
which the  CAC developed some guidelines (CAC, 2003c: 
83). However, the assessment of bioterrorist risk is facing 
problems regarding both elements, the assessment of prob-
abilities and of the adverse effects: 
1.  Probability assessment. Bioterrorist risk may be charac-
terised as “new” risks where the probabilities are un-
known and therefore they face the situation of uncer-
tainty. Probabilities can hardly be based on frequencies 
as empirical information on past events is weak.
15 Be-
sides this general problem of few reported events the 
existing literature lacks comprehension and accuracy 
regarding the type of attacks (deliberate or incidental; 
terrorist, criminal or state motivated; bio- or food terro-
rism) (TUCKER, 1999: 1; CARUS, 2001: 3).  
In particular for the last decade, CARUS (2001) derives 
an increasing trend of all biological attacks (table 2).
16 
The minority of all attacks was caused by terrorist moti-
vation. 
Table 2 does not differentiate among types of terrorist 
attack and therefore a review of existing studies was 
necessary to identify specific food terrorist cases caused 
by deliberating biological agents in the food chain 
(CHALK, 2004; CARUS, 2001; MANNING  et al., 2005; 
PARKER, 2002; TUCKER, 1999; WHO, 2002). As a result 
only three food terrorist attacks could be identified   
out of the sum of 27 cases since 1900 of which the   
contamination of salad bars by a religious fanatic   
                                                    
15   MOFFITT et al. (2005) provides an analysis of modelling con-
cepts for bioterrorism in the context of uncertainty.  
16   Note, that the improved reporting over time can be a relevant 
parameter influencing this result.  Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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group in Oregon, U.S., in 1984, is the most known one  
(Rajneeshee case).
17 
2.  Damage assessment. Potential damages consist of direct 
economic effects on supply and demand, secondary 
losses for up- and downstream markets, indirect effects 
including trade losses, and all socio-psychological long-
term effects reducing political and social stability. The 
damages depend on the relevance of the agricultural 
sector for an economy: the economic impacts of bioter-
rorism attacks relate to direct losses of crops, livestock, 
and other assets, losses in the agribusiness network, and 
indirect effects resulting from loss of export markets, 
price, and growth effects (SCHAUB, 2002; MONKE, 2005; 
CHALK, 2004). Just a minority of the few studies on 
bioterrorist attacks list or evaluate the caused damage 
and only for the Rajneeshee case, information on ill-
nesses in the population is available (see table 3). 
A possible proxy for assessing the damages of intention-
nal food terrorist attacks can be the costs of food in-
cidents
18, since in this area of unintentional contamina-
tion more evidence exists (see table 3, last column). 
However, only very few data on the monetary evalua-
tion of damages is available. Nevertheless, these studies 
indicate that the values can be rather significant, as for 
example the damage of the Listeria incidence of 1998 in 
the U.S. was assessed with 50-70 Mio $, and the Esche-
richa coli incidence of 1996 in the U.S. with 14 Mio $ 
(see table 3). A very comprehensive study of BUZBY et 
al. (1996) calculated costs per single pathogen per year 
and estimated 6.5-30 Mio $ and 9 000 deaths each year 
for the U.S. 
3.  Conclusions on WTO conformity. Because of the men-
tioned difficulties, the basis for assessing the bioterrorist 
risk of an individual country is limited. Therefore con-
clusions for food terrorist risks cannot be drawn easily. 
PARKER (2002) and HALK (2004) identified a poten-
tially high risk level for agroterrorism attacks for the 
U.S. They base their result on U.S. specific production 
patterns that tend to increase probabilities and damages: 
large size or complexity of agribusiness networks, high 
degree of monocultures, large spatial production con-
centration, high degree of vertical integration, large 
scope of unregistered illicit employment especially in 
                                                    
17   The other two happened in Africa but were not linked directly 
to human consumption as cattle were attacked.  
18   See OECD (2003b) for an overview on existing studies. 
the service area (restaurants and bars), and intensive 
husbandry systems that increase the vulnerability of in-
fections.  
Food terrorism may depend on different parameters than 
agroterrorism since other actors are involved (e.g. proc-
essing and retail systems). Nevertheless, it is to assume 
that a similar risk will be identified for the U.S. food 
chain.
19 However, given the limited knowledge about 
food terrorism probabilities and damage, it is difficult to 
evaluate whether the U.S. protection level achieved by 
the implementation of the BTA is justified and thereby 
WTO conform.  
3.2.2 Use of recommended international standards:  
harmonization   
In this section it will be evaluated whether the BTA provi-
sions follow the harmonization rules of the SPS Agreement 
using recommended international standards or whether the 
BTA implements stricter standards that must be justified by 
a scientific risk assessment. For dangerous substances and 
the design of import regimes, the two regulatory areas cov-
ered by the BTA, different international standards exist. 
Therefore, the analysis will be carried out separately for 
these two parts. 
Harmonization related to addressed hazards 
As indicated in chapter 3.2.1 the identification of hazards is 
the basis for a risk assessment process. However, the relevant 
hazards are not specifically addressed in Title III of the BTA 
and only the very general statement in the form of “bio-
terrorist threats to the food supply” is provided (Section 301a).  
                                                    
19   The risk assessment undertaken by official site came to a 
similar finding for food terrorism. They conclude “that there is 
a high likelihood, over the course of a year that a significant 
number of people will be affected by an act of food terrorism” 
(FDA, 2003a: 8).  
Table 3.   Damage assessment of terrorist and 
incidental food contamination 
Case  Listed cases 
of illness 
Food terrorist attacks 
Rajneeshee (CARUS, 2001)  751 
Food incidences 
Enteriditis infection from ice cream, 
1994 USA (WHO, 2002) 
224 000 cases of 
illness 
Escherichia coli infection from radish 
sprouts, 1996 in Japan (WHO, 2002) 
8 000 cases of illness 
including deaths 
Monetary damage assessment 
Escherichia coli infection of apple 
juice, 1996 USA (WHO, 2002) 
70 cases, 1 death 
14 Mio $ 
Listeria infected meat, 1998 USA 
(WHO, 2002) 
35 cases of illness 
50-70 Mio $ 
All microbioliogical pathogens in food 
per year, USA (BUZBY et al., 1996) 
9 000 deaths 
6,5-30 Mio $  
Source: own compilation 
Table 2.   Motivation of terrorism cases:  
frequency over time 







1990-99  19  40 94  153 
1980-89  3  6 0  9 
1970-79  3  2 3  8 
1930-69  2  4 0  6 
1900-29  0  4 0  4 
Total  27  56 97  180 
Source: CARUS, 2001: 11 Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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1.  BTA provisions for bioterrorism hazards. The applica-
tion area of the BTA is not referring to selected hazard-
ous substances, but addresses the transmitter of risky 
agents, i.e. products. Nevertheless, under Title II on 
“Enhancing Controls on Dangerous Biological Agents 
and Toxins” the BTA regulates the possessing and 
transfer of listed agents and toxins. These listed agents 
can serve as indicators for the U.S. definition on rele-
vant hazards and are defined by different U.S. agencies: 
APHIS lists 52 agents as potentially bioterrorist danger-
ous
20 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) identifies 37 bioterrorism agents with special 
impact for human health. As we concentrate on human 
health the following analysis focuses only on those   




2.  International standards.  It is important to distinguish 
between different types of standards for which interna-
tional standards are provided by either the CAC regard-
ing food or the World Organization for Animal Health 
(OIE) regarding animal health:  
• CAC standards for food focus mainly on product stan-
dards (e.g. maximum residua levels for pesticides). 
For bioterrorist agents processing standards are more 
relevant, however these standards are not covered by 
the existing list. For such standards usually only very 
rough CAC provisions exist like the “General princi-
ples of meat hygiene” (CAC, 2003a) or the “Guide-
lines for canned products” (CAC, 1985). 
• The OIE standards of the Terrestrial Animal Health 
Code (“The Code”) define health measures to be used 
by the veterinary authorities of importing and export-
ing countries (OIE, 2004a). Relevant here are the 
standards with regard to the requirement of notifica-
tion of certain diseases (OIE, 2004a: part 2).
23  
3.  Conclusions on WTO conformity. Table 4 summarizes 
the comparison of agents relevant for public health ad-
dressed in the BTA and in international guidelines: diver-
gence of standards can be identified already among the 
U.S. standards’ lists as APHIS covers six more agents 
than CDC (marked in grey). Comparing the BTA list 
with the standards addressed by international organiza-
tions, no difference can be recognized: all BTA zoonotics 
are also covered at international level. Therefore the 
BTA is not more stringent than SPS standards and not in 
conflict with WTO rules (MONKE, 2005).
24  
                                                    
20   Title 7 CFR, Part 331, Title 9 CFR, Part 121 and Title 42, Parts 
72 and 73. 
21   Therefore, all agents determined by USDA are excluded as 
they are referring to livestock pathogens and toxins which are 
only dangerous for animals and plants.  
22   Zoones are diseases that may spread from animals to humans. 
The list of the USDA that is restricted only to animal and plant 
health is excluded.  
23   Diseases to be notified fulfill criteria of international rele-
vance, i.e. they should have the potential of international 
spread and human infections or causing other dangerous dis-
eases. 
24   But if extending this analysis to agents that are only dangerous 
to animal and plant health, the BTA covers more standards 
than OIE: Akabane, Camel pox, and Menangle (MONKE, 2005). 
Harmonization of rules related to the enforcement measures at 
the border 
Manifold instruments can be used to achieve a chosen do-
mestic protection level. The administrative instruments of 
the BTA can be classified as process standards that are not 
physically observable in the product (JOSLING et al., 2004: 
18). Respective international standards for import admini-
stration are covered by different WTO Agreements (see 
footnote 13) but we still focus on food specific measures as 
regulated by the SPS Agreement and relevant international 
organisations.  
1.  BTA provisions. The BTA measures can be summarized 
according to their general objectives as (1) informative 
requirements targeted by registration, U.S. agent defini-
tion, prior notice, and record keeping and as (2) control 
measures implemented through the provision on deten-
tion. With respect to the information objective, the BTA 
requires highly individualized information at the single 
company level, and imports may be detained at the bor-
der when failing to fulfill this requirement. 
2.  International standards. Regarding information requi-
rements, standards relate to risk specific and regional in-
                                                                                                 
Whether Menangle can cause human infections and thereby 
would be relevant for public health is currently discussed in 
the scientific community (OIE, 2004b). If this possibility 
would be confirmed, the BTA could be evaluated as diverging 
from SPS provisions for the case of those agents which are 
dangerous to human health. 
Table 4.   Comparative coverage of food terrorist 
agents with public health impact  
BTA reference  International 
organizations 
APHIS  CDC  OIE  CAC 
Antrax    X  X   
Botulinum neurotoxins   X    X 
Botulinum n. producing species of 
Clostridium  
X  X 
Brucella abortus   X  X  X 
Brucella melitensis   X  X  X 
Brucella suis   X  X  X 
Burkholderia malle   X  X   
Burkholderia pseudomallei   X  X   
Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin  X    X 
Coccidioides immitis   - X   
Coxiella burnetii   X  X   
Eastern equine encephalitis virus  X  X   
Francisella tularensis   X  X   
Hendra virus  - X   
Nipah virus   - X   
Rift Valley fever virus   - X   
Shigatoxin X    X 
Staphylococcal enterotoxins   -  X 
T-2 toxin   -  X 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus   X  X   
Source:   own compilation based on information from APHIS, 
CDC, CAC, OIE and MONKE (2005) Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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formation (e.g. OIE Code, Article 2.2.1.2, OIE, 2004a) 
or on certification schemes (CAC, 2000). Regarding 
import controls, no precise standards (e.g. frequency   
of controls) but rather broad frameworks and principles 
exist (CAC, 2003b): For example, the OIE defines rules 
for the diagnostic procedures to be undertaken at the 
border (OIE Code, Appendix 2.10.1.4). 
3.  Conclusions on WTO conformity. The major difference 
between the BTA and international standards concerns 
the first category, the information addressee and the   
required information: whereas the international organi-
sations only demand broad regionalized information,   
the BTA call for individual company information. Fur-
thermore, the BTA does not request any disease specific 
information but only traceability related information. 
However, this identified difference does not allow   
drawing the conclusion that the BTA is stricter than   
requirements of the SPS Agreement: at the WTO level, 
information requirements of process standards are any-
how more individualized and flexibly adjustable to 
country and disease specific conditions than those of 
product standards. For instance, whereas the burden   
of proof to demonstrate the process standards having   
the “risk free status” in a region or country (process 
standard) lies with the exporter, the importer has the   
option to control the validity of the declared risk status 
by additional measures: import permits granted by the 
importer are often based on either the additional evalua-
tion of “on the spot conditions”, a comprehensive   
assessment of regulatory programmes, or on quarantine 
procedures leading in the end to a degree of infor-
mation’s individualization similar to that of the BTA 
(BRÜCKNER, 2004: 10).  
Related to the second category, control measures, the BTA 
only regulates procedures for detention in cases of “credible 
evidence” whereas the OIE defines risk specific require-
ments like diagnostic procedures (OIE Code, Appendix 
2.10.1.4.). It is important to state that neither the CAC pro-
vides specific standards for import control systems in terms 
of frequencies or samples (CAC, 2003b; CAC, 1995) nor 
does the BTA. Hence, since no guidelines are specified, no 
deviation of the BTA from international standard can be 
identified. 
Given the flexibility of the existing international standards, 
the BTA cannot be evaluated as being stricter. The identi-
fied distinctions between the BTA and international guide-
lines result from the different regulatory purposes: the BTA 
explicitly addresses national security whereas the standards 
of international organisations aim at food safety and least-
hindered trade.  
3.2.3 Specific design of the enforcement measures 
3.2.3.1 Non-discrimination and national treatment 
Formally, the BTA provisions are applicable to all import-
ers and thereby they are non-discriminatory. However, 
there may be some factual differences because of individual 
trade patterns: if some trade partners had certain bilateral 
arrangements facilitating trade prior to the adoption of the 
BTA, their situation became relatively worse compared to 
other countries. Similar findings might hold with respect to 
product categories affected differently (table 1) and size of 
import quantities if we expect smaller lots to be affected 
relatively stronger. However, as these effects result from 
usual economic adjustments of trade patterns due to changed 
legislation, the provisions of the BTA as such cannot be 
interpreted as discriminatory. 
National treatment is ensured since, in principal, the BTA 
provisions are applicable to both, domestic and foreign 
producers. Nevertheless, some provisions are either not 
relevant for domestic producers or their economic burden 
may be lower:  
• The designation of a U.S. agent is not relevant for U.S. 
firms. Since there is already established a professional 
market offering the agent’s services to foreign compa-
nies
25, this provision must be seen as problematic in the 
international framework as it certainly leads to a compli-
ance cost difference between domestic and foreign pro-
ducers. The specific burden for foreign companies is de-
pending on the transactions costs and fees for finding and 
maintaining such representatives.  
• Prior notice of imports is not relevant for domestic pro-
ducers. Hence, they are not facing transportation delays as 
importers do. An evaluation of related costs identifies 
significant additional burden for foreign companies (see 
table 5).  
• Differences may also refer to the frequency of controls 
either at the border or critical points in the domestic sup-
ply chain. No cost assessments on different control types 
exist so far. 
3.2.3.2 Equivalence 
While international standard setting aims at the harmoniza-
tion of the protection level, equivalence grants flexibility in 
the implementation process, i.e. with respect to the choice 
of specific measures to achieve the protection level. The 
SPS Agreement explicitly encourages bilateral consulta-
tions on the acceptance of different implementation meas-
ures and refers to international guidelines for conformity 
assessment. In principal, this provision recognizes that 
regulatory flexibility allows countries to allocate resources 
efficiently rather than identical (Josling et al., 2004: 48). 
The burden of proof for demonstrating equivalence lies 
with the exporter. Trade can be hindered if the importer is 
not accepting the proof and additional import requirements 
or a trade ban are imposed.  
Equivalence agreements are potentially more beneficial for 
process than product standards since for product standards, 
compliance with existing standards can be checked directly 
by means of product characteristics. On the contrary, proc-
ess standards are more difficult to verify at the border and 
need to be inspected through expensive on-spot controls in 
the exporting country itself (OECD, 1994). Therefore, in 
particular for this group of BTA agents equivalence agree-
ments offer potential gains since they replace the proof of 
similarity which involves expensive on-spot measures for 
each standard. BTA provisions that define information and 
control aspects belong to this group of process standards. 
Here, equivalence agreements may facilitate trade. How-
                                                    
25   One example for such services is the company U.S. Food 
Agents, requiring around 600 $ for providing an agent for a 
facility per year. See    
http://www.usafoodagents.com/pricing.html#BPP, July 2005. Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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ever, only very few equivalence agreements exist as admin-
istrative transaction costs for negotiating and accepting 
equivalent measures seem to be very high.
26  
Besides the comprehensive U.S. Veterinary Agreement 
with the EU, other equivalence acceptance only exists for 
certain meat and dairy products with selected partner coun-
tries (APHIS, 2004), or are addressed within free trade 
agreements (e.g. Chile). However, in free trade agreements, 
SPS measures are usually only covered in a very general 
manner via general cooperation obligations and the promise 
to implement WTO standards (see Chile-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, par. 6). The provisions of the BTA clearly 
overrule existing provisions within the bilateral agreements 
as far as FDA products are concerned. 
3.2.3.3 Least-trade distortion 
The measurement of least-trade distortion according to Art. 
5.6. of the SPS Agreement requires a comparative analysis 
of alternative import regimes achieving the same protection 
level. Since no comparative analysis of alternative trade 
measures is possible and given the described constraints in 
evaluating the appropriate level of protection (see chapter 
3.2.1), several adjustments in the analysis were necessary. 
Furthermore, trade distortion will be assessed taking the 
trade impact as proxy. This is admissible since we assume 
that a lower trade effect is associated with less trade distor-
tion. A third adjustment relates to the second requirement 
of Art. 5.6, i.e. the technical and economic feasibility of 
                                                    
26   The Veterinarian Agreement between the U.S. and the EU, 
signed in 1999, took six years of negotiations (JOSLING et al., 
2004: 49).  
measures. In some WTO disputes, this has led to findings 
where an import ban was the accepted answer to a sanitary 
or phytosanitary risk since all other measures of protection 
would be either too costly to implement or would not pro-
vide the same level of protection.
27 As we are not compar-
ing different alternatives for the U.S. to enforce their pro-
tection level, comparative conclusions on economic and 
technical feasibility cannot be drawn.  
Table 5 presents an overview of the cost and trade impact 
of the food related BTA provisions. There are two measures 
from which potential trade impact can be expected. The 
requirement to send a prior notice for all food shipments 
has different impact depending on the import procedure 
prior to the implementation of the BTA.
28 Furthermore, the 
prior notice can be only electronically submitted to the 
FDA, implying that firms without computer equipment and 
internet access either have to acquire this equipment or 
cease trade with the U.S. For some firms in developing 
countries this might be a difficult or impossible require-
ment, not only because of the occurring costs but also due 
to ineffective information technology.
29 
                                                    
27   For instance, in the Hormone Cases the Appellate Bodies 
stated that the import ban on U.S. and Canadian beef was ac-
cepted as the only feasible measure but was condemned be-
cause of the missing risk assessment (RUDLOFF, 2005). 
28   In particular Mexico and Canada, countries with formerly 
expedited import procedures (see FR  68, Vol. 197: 59028) 
have disadvantages with the new system since planning of 
shipments and entry into the U.S. makes a longer time horizon 
necessary. 
29   Note that some of these administrative concerns were ad-
dressed by the FDA in the regulatory process. Upon suggesti-
Table 5.   Potential firm and trade impact of BTA provisions  




(-) Increase of administrative burden 
(-) Maintenance of US Agents  
     involves cost for firms 
(-)  FDA estimate: 16% of foreign 
firms will cease imports, especially 
firms with only few shipments 
One time costs: 176 $ 




–  Records might be covered by  
existing record keeping systems 
–  If not: increase of administrative 
burden  
(+)  Might increase quality assurance 
and logistics 
(+)  Quick response in cases of emer-
gencies might help to keep/restore 
consumer confidence 
One time costs: 1 517 $ 
Maintenance: 270 $ 
Prior notice  (0) Notice can be done mostly within 
normal import procedure 
(-) Importers working formerly under 
expedited arrival procedure have 
disadvantages 
(-) Problem of notification for firms  
without internet access/computer 
equipment 
(-)  Slow down of food entry into the 
U.S. due to processing or inspec-
tion problems (especially relevant 
for perishable products)  
 
(+)  Inspections might be better targeted 
One time costs: 3 698 $ 
Costs per entry: 75 $ 
Detention  (-) Firms have to bear costs of deten-
tion: cost of disposal or sale at re-
duced prices  
(-) Increases uncertainty of trade   Costs per detention: 100-90 000 
$ depending on product and  
procedures (handling, storage, 
appeal, re-labeling)  
Note: (-)/(+)/(0) refers to a potentially negative/positive/unclear trade impact, respectively. 
1)  Estimates result from the FDA “Analysis of Economic Impact” of the Proposed (administrative detention, record keeping) and 
Interim Final Rule (registration, prior notice) published in FR 68, Vol. 90 and Vol. 197, respectively. Where a distinction in the FR 
was made, the assumed costs for foreign firms and sufficient English knowledge were chosen. 
Source: own compilation based on FDA Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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A second potential and probably more significant trade 
impact results from the requirements that all foreign firms 
must designate a U.S. agent that represents their company 
in the U.S. and is 24 hours a day available 7 days per week. 
In theory, this agent might be a private individual since this 
person only serves as a communication link between the 
FDA and the foreign company and no legal liability is re-
lated to the function. In practice however, the requirement 
to be available 24 hours a day all year long is not easy to 
fulfil for private persons and most foreign firms are seeking 
some business partner, foreign chamber of commerce rep-
resentative, or legal entity to execute that function. This 
results in costs that can differ considerably.
30 Given that the 
FDA estimated in its economic impact analysis of the pro-
posed rules that up to 16% of the firms or an equivalent of 
up to 2% of all shipments might be affected by this regula-
tion and cease trade with the U.S. (FR 68, Vol. 197: 58943) 
it is difficult to see that this requirement is addressed in the 
least-trade distorting way.
31 The FDA expected in particular 
that small firms with less than 10 yearly line entries into the 
U.S. will be affected by this provision.  
The other two proposed measures, administrative detention 
and record keeping, should not impose too many new re-
quirements on exporting firms, since record keeping of 
suppliers and recipients is well established in many coun-
tries.
32 Here again, countries with less developed food 
safety and traceability systems will have problems to com-
ply. It is to assume that mainly developing countries will be 
affected by this provision.
33 The provision of administrative 
detention is probably the least trade distorting element of 
the BTA. In addition, a “Dear Colleague” Letter from May 
27, 2004 further clarifies this rule and points out that they 
“do not […] foresee frequently using administrative deten-
tion under” this rule (FDA, 2004). A review of FDA deten-
tion statistics for the year 2005 reveals that no product 
detention related to Section 304 of the BTA has occurred.  
4. Evidence from bilateral trade data 
In this chapter we focus on the trade impact of the BTA 
provisions. As we have seen in the previous section, some 
of the provisions apply specifically to imports and involve 
compliance costs for the importing firms. Depending on the 
burden sharing of the costs, these are losses that either im-
porters or exporters have to carry, thereby reducing their 
profits. If these compliance costs of foreign firms cannot be 
                                                                                                 
ons of trading partners, the FDA streamlined their import in-
formation system and made prior notification within the usual 
import information processing system available (FDA, 2003b). 
30  The company U.S. Food Agents requires e.g. around 600 $ 
p.a. whereas the German American Chamber of Commerce is 
providing this service for 140 Euro p.a. for member firms (see 
http://www.gaccny .com/index.php?id=71&L=1). See also 
KERR (2004). 
31   This is even more questionable given that an emergency con-
tact for foreign firms is allowed to be located outside of the 
U.S. 
32   See also the traceability provisions in the EU (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2002). 
33   See OTSUKI et al. (2001b) for an impact estimation and JAFFEE 
and HENSON (2004) for a discussion of standards on the com-
petitive situation of developing countries. 
carried over to the market price of the importing country, 
these cost asymmetry between domestic and foreign firms 
may lead to a substitution of imported with domestically 
produced goods (see ROBERTS et al., 1999; BALDWIN, 2001, 
and BUZBY, 2003). These developments – if they take place 
– are assumed to be identified in the import pattern over 
time. Hence, we work under the hypothesis that potential 
trade effects of the BTA may be seen in reduced import 
volumes for food categories that are most affected by the 
compliance costs of the provisions.
34 This implies that we 
expect to see no changes in the trade pattern if the BTA 
provisions have only a minor or no trade impact. In this 
case, food imports after the implementation of the BTA will 
develop according to the trade pattern of the last decade, i.e. 
follow the positive trend that could be observed for a num-
ber of food categories (see appendix).  
Our approach follows an analysis provided by OECD 
(2003a) where trade flow patterns were used to analyze if 
import quantities changed as a result of a policy reform. 
This approach implies that all deviations from past import 
patterns can be attributed to this policy change. This as-
sumptions neglect other exogenous factors such as ex-
change rate movements, or changes in the macroeconomic 
or regulatory environment that may affect trade flows.
35 In 
addition, this method cannot distinguish among the individ-
ual impacts of single BTA provisions, but look on the regu-
latory impact as a whole. However, since our approach is 
rather easy to perform, this analysis provides a good start-
ing point for a more thorough analysis of the trade impact 
and may hint on sectors that are of particular interest for 
such an analysis.  
Given the findings of the analysis of the least-trade distort-
ing effect of the BTA in the last section, our analysis of 
bilateral import data for the U.S. is driven by the following 
questions:  
1.  Does the import pattern change after the time of the 
implementation of the BTA? 
2.  What is the impact on small and large import volumes? 
3.  How are different types of importing countries affected? 
We use bilateral import data for the U.S. as recorded in the 
WORLD TRADE ATLAS which is based on the UN COM-
TRADE data base. The trade flow analysis is done for all 
relevant food categories (see table 1). In the following 
analysis we compare the import pattern of the year 2003 
(“before the BTA entered into force”) with the year 2004 
(“after the BTA entered into force”).
36 We chose to only 
rely on a direct comparison of import developments of the 
two years adjacent to the BTA implementation, given that 
this comparative analysis of trade flow developments can-
not account for any other exogenous variables that may 
                                                    
34   Note that this hypothesis implicitly assumes that no positive 
demand effect is created through the BTA. NTB theory sug-
gests that demand stimulation may occur when newly imple-
mented standards achieve a higher safety level in the food 
chain and these new standards are comprehensible to consu-
mers (THILMANY and BARRETT, 1997). 
35   These effects can be captured when estimating a gravity model 
or import demand system. 
36   Given that the BTA entered into force December, 8 of 2003, 
we have a small bias in the reference situation covering the 
trade volume of three weeks.  Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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change (e.g. exchange rates, GDP) and impact on the trade 
pattern. Hence, a short-term comparison horizon is advis-
able. All calculations are done for quarterly values at HS4 
level of the international commodity classification of the 
World Customs Organisation, however, for the ease of 
presentation, they are subsequently aggregated to yearly 
HS2 level.  
4.1 Import pattern before and after the implementa-
tion of the BTA 
Table 6 presents an overview on the import pattern before 
and after the implementation of the BTA. In average, 4 825 
import lines
37 were recorded at the U.S. border during the 
reference period. After the implementation of the BTA, 
15% of these import lines no longer show any trade with 
the U.S., 35% of the import lines show a decrease in the 
average trade volume, and 50% of the import lines recorded 
in the reference period show an increase in the trade vol-
ume after the implementation of the BTA. The observation 
of the increase in trade volume for half of the import lines 
is in accordance with the observation that the aggregate 
trade volume of food imports increased also after the intro-
duction of the BTA (see appendix). This is an indication 
that not all importers were similarly affected by the BTA 
implementation. A further differentiation of the impacts 
will be provided in the following sections.  
Out of the 35% import lines that show a decrease in trade 
volume, only 3% show a significant decrease, i.e. the vol-
ume reduction of the import line lays outside a confidence 
                                                    
37   Each import line represents the average imports at HS4 level 
of a country in the indicated time period. The terms “import 
line”, “importer”, and “importing country” are used interchan-
geable for these quantities. 
interval that was constructed around the mean of the import 
line in the reference period. If we add up the countries   
that stopped imports to the U.S. and those that showed   
a significant decrease, we may conclude that at least 18%  
of almost all U.S. food import lines of the year 2003   
were negatively affected after the BTA implementation. 
Nevertheless, table 6 shows that not all food categories   
are similarly affected. We observe a mostly negative impact 
for perishable products, spices, coffee, tea, and for various 
grain and processed grain products. On the other side,   
for most of the processed categories less impact can be 
found given that the number of countries that cease imports 
decrease considerably for those commodities.  
In general, the findings are in line with the identified poten-
tial impacts of the FDA who estimated that around 16% of 
foreign firms will cease trade with the U.S. (see previous 
section). Similarly, the FDA expected a more severe effect 
for perishable products due to the time sensitivity of these 
products. An aspect that needs further consideration is the 
development of the trade pattern of the processed/value-
added product groups such as sugars, preserved food, or 
miscellaneous foods. According to Table 1, these are the 
groups with the most significant changes in the import 
protocol, however, this is not reflected in the development 
of the import pattern.  
4.2 Differences among small and large import  
volumes 
Table 7 shows the development of the import pattern before 
and after the BTA implementation differentiated by small 
and large import volumes in the various HS categories. The 
volume differentiation of the import lines is done according 
to the total import volume in the year 2003. Subsequently, 
Table 6.   Import pattern before and after the BTA implementation (number of HS4 commodity lines)   
   Prior to BTA  After BTA (Import lines 2004) 
Food category 
Import lines  
(2003)  stop decrease   
decrease  
> 2 std.  increase  
increase  
> 2 std. 
   abs. abs.  %  abs.  %  abs. abs.  %  abs. 
Fish, seafood  531  75  14 195 37 15  261  49 73 
Vegetables 441  88  20 153 35 21  199  45 52 
Edible fruits, nuts  439  85  19 139 32 20  215  49 84 
Spices, coffee, tea  431  81  19 152 35 13  198  46 61 
Cereals 102  31  30 23 23 2  48  47 20 
Milling, malt, starch  285  68  24 88 31 16  129  45 52 
Miscellaneous grain  251  49  20 80 32 10  122  49 49 
Fats, oils  311  52  17 106 34 13  153  49 66 
Prepared fish  123  14  11 38 31 2  71  58 20 
Sugars 86  8  9 35  41 1  43  50 8 
Cocoa 182  23  13 72 40 7  87  48 22 
Baking related  309  22  7 105  34 6  182  59 41 
Preserved food  542  61  11 210 39 14  271  50 68 
Miscellaneous food  350  38  11 122 35 10  190  54 50 
Beverages 442  41  9 159  36 13  242  55 56 
Sum 4825  736  15 1677 35 163  2411  50 722 
Note: The analysis is done at HS4 classification. This table presents the aggregated results on HS2 level. 
“Decrease (increase) > 2 std.” represents the import lines where the decrease (increase) in the period after the implementation of the 
BTA where larger than the mean of the reference period minus (plus) two times the standard deviation of the respective import line in 
the reference period. 
Source: own calculations based on WORLD TRADE ATLAS, 2006Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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the lowest (“small”) and highest (“large”) quartile of the 
distribution is chosen for the analysis.  
The comparison across all food categories shows a consid-
erable impact difference for small and large import vol-
umes: whereas only 1% of the large importers quit trade 
with the U.S., around 40% of the small importers ceased 
imports after the implementation of the BTA. For the group 
of importers that decrease imports since the implementati-
on, we observe the opposite effect: only 20% of the small 
importers decrease the trade volume compared to 40% of 
the large importers. However, the quartile with the small 
import lines contain a much higher number of cases where 
the trade reduction is considerably more pronounced   
(98 cases compared to only 1 for the large import volumes). 
The statistics on increase in trade volume after the adoption 
of the BTA follows again the trend observed already in the 
category of ceased imports: only 39% of the small import 
lines show an increase in imports compared to circa 60% of 
the import lines with the largest trade volumes. However, 
the significance of the increase is much more pronounced 
for the small volumes. For the different HS categories the 
picture differs somewhat depending on the product, but the 
findings are in line with the developments observed in ta-
ble  6 where we concluded that perishable products and 
cereals based commodities seem to be more affected than 
processed food. 
Table 7.   Import pattern of small and large import volumes before and after the BTA implementation  
(number of HS4 commodity lines)  
      Prior to BTA  After BTA (Import lines 2004) 
   Import 
volume 
Import lines  
(2003)  stop   decrease  
decrease  
> 2 std.  increase  
increase 
> 2 std. 
      abs. abs.  %  abs.  %  abs. abs.  %  abs. 
small 134 58  43 24 18 12  52  39 44  Fish, seafood 
large 134  1  1 68  51     65  49 1 
small 112 65  58 15 13 7  31  28 25  Vegetables 
large 112  2  2 35  31     75  67    
small 112 58  52 12 11 7  42  38 38  Edible fruits, 
nuts  large 112      0 39  35     73  65 4 
small 109 53  49 17 16 9  39  36 32  Spices, coffee, 
tea  large 109  1  1 45  41     63  58    
small 27 14  52 2  7     11  41 9  Cereals 
large 27  3  11 11 41 1  13  48 3 
small 72 32  44 16 22 10  24  33 20  Milling, malt, 
starch  large 72  3  4 32  44     37  51 5 
small 63 30  48 11 17 8  22  35 18  Miscellaneous 
grain  large 63  2  3 20  32     41  65 7 
small 79 26  33 15 19 4  38  48 33  Fats, oils 
large 79  3  4 28  35     48  61 6 
small 31 10  32 7 23 2  14  45 12  Prepared fish 
large 31      0 10  32     21  68    
small 22  8  36 5 23 1  9  41 5  Sugars 
large 22      0 10  45     12  55    
small 45 16  36 15 33 6  14  31 11  Cocoa 
large 45      0 20  44     25  56    
small 78 18  23 20 26 6  40  51 25  Baking related 
large 78      0 32  41     46  59    
small 136 42  31 39 29 10  55  40 42  Preserved food 
large 136  1  1 55  40     80  59 3 
small 88 30  34 17 19 3  41  47 34  Miscellaneous 
food  large 88      0 33  38     55  63 1 
small 112 32  29 32 29 13  48  43 35  Beverages 
large 112      0 48  43     64  57    
small 1220 492  40 247 20 98  480  39 383 
Sum 
large 1220 16  1 486  40 1  718  59 30 
Note: The analysis is done at HS4 classification. This table presents the aggregated results on HS2 level.  
“Decrease (increase) > 2 std.” represents the import lines where the decrease (increase) in the period after the implementation of the 
BTA where larger than the mean of the reference period minus (plus) two times the standard deviation of the respective import line in 
the reference period. 
Source: own calculations based on WORLD TRADE ATLAS, 2006Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
158 
4.3 Regional differentiation of the import pattern 
Finally, we analyze the regional impact of the BTA imple-
mentation. We ordered the importing countries according to 
typical country classifications (NAFTA, CAFTA, LCD 
etc.) and analyzed their import pattern (table 8). Out of the 
4  825 import lines that were recorded in total for these 
country groups in the year 2003, 208 import lines came 
from NAFTA countries (i.e. Canada and Mexico). After the 
BTA implementation, we observe a stop of imports for 5% 
of the lines, a slight decrease for around 31% of the volu-
mes, and an increase for the rest of the import lines.  
If we compare this development with the one of the other 
country groups we can find a somewhat different picture. In 
particular for the LCD and African countries, a significant 
share of their trade seems to be affected by the BTA. Ho-
wever, as before, at the same time, we also can observe that 
some of their import quantities show slight to strong increa-
ses in the trade volume. The EU is the importer that shows 
by far the highest number of import lines into the U.S. befo-
re the implementation of the BTA. 15% of these imports are 
set out after the BTA implementation, and around 37% 
decrease with 10% (65) showing a significant reduction. On 
the other hand, 48% of the EU imports show light to strong 
increases. 
This exploratory analysis of the development of the import 
pattern of the U.S. before and after the implementation of 
the BTA shows that the BTA potentially did have an effect 
on the import pattern and trade of certain commodities 
(perishable products, grains) and countries (with small 
import volumes, LDC, Africa). The above presented indica-
tors disclosed broad short-term changes in the import pat-
tern after the BTA implementation that may result from the 
ongoing compliance process. However, the results should 
be cautiously interpreted and a further a statistical verifica-
tion of these effects is necessary (and underway) to obtain 
more robust results. In addition, the analyzed time span of 
imports under the new legislation is rather short. It is to 
assume that over times, firms are able to adapt to the new 
standards and reduce costs of compliance and that imports 
will move back towards old import levels.  
5. Conclusion 
The analysis explored challenges in evaluating trade effects 
for the increasingly relevant NTB group of administrative, 
information-related import measures in the context of the 
Bioterrorism Act of the U.S. An additional difficulty arises 
from the fact that the administrative rules of the BTA target 
at the reduction of bioterrorism risk whereas existing WTO 
rules as set out in the SPS Agreement focus on food safety. 
This newly emerging area of biosecurity issues in food 
trade is still without an explicit counterpart in the WTO 
framework. The analysis of conformity of the BTA with 
existing SPS rules highlights the available flexibility in the 
area of process standards, which is the relevant group of 
standards for administrative import provisions. This flexi-
bility allows appropriate scope for the prevention of disease 
spread by considering disease specific characteristics, but 
constrains the evaluation whether international standards 
are overruled.  
The results of the empirical trade flow analysis illustrate 
differences in the compliance costs between countries. This 
differentiation can be caused by adjustment and learning 
costs that may differ among countries: countries working 
prior to the legal amendment in a more open import envi-
ronment characterized by expedited import procedures, free 
trade agreements, or equivalence agreements, face adjust-
ments that may be relatively more difficult than for coun-
tries always used to strict rules. The same is true in relation 
to products for which stricter rules are in place under the 
BTA compared to other products. Additional analyses indi-
cate the “fixed cost” character of administrative import 
rules as small import quantities are affected most. A special 
problem seems to appear for developing countries that are 
lacking technical or human resource capacities to comply 
with these new administrative rules. Developing countries 
often import only small lots which imply an over-
proportional cost increase and they are often importers of 
those products for which major regulatory changes could be 
identified. 
Given that there is only very limited experience with food 
terrorism attacks and the design of regulatory protection 
Table 8.   Regional differentiation of import pattern before and after the BTA implementation (number of 
HS4 commodity lines) 
   Prior to BTA  After BTA (Import lines 2004) 
   Import lines  
(2003)  stop   decrease  
decrease  
> 2 std.  increase  
increase  
> 2 std. 
   abs. abs.  %  abs.  %  abs. abs.  %  abs. 
NAFTA 207  11  5 65  31 1  131  63 17 
CAFTA 306  36  12 105 34 11  165  54 40 
LDC 202  62  31 58 29 11  82  41 49 
EU 1124  164  15 415 37 43  545  48 160 
Pacific Asia  741  67  9 253  34 9  421  57 99 
South America  584  66  11 190 33 17  328  56 95 
Africa 305  73  24 113 37 21  118  39 37 
Note: The analysis is done at HS4 classification. This table presents the aggregated results on HS2 level. 
The group of African countries does not include African LDCs. 
“Decrease (increase) > 2 std.” represents the import lines where the decrease (increase) in the period after the implementation of the 
BTA where larger than the mean of the reference period minus (plus) two times the standard deviation of the respective import line in 
the reference period. 
Source: own calculations based on WORLD TRADE ATLAS, 2006Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 3 
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instruments, this work highlights areas that should be con-
sidered in further analyses. However, the discussion made 
clear that with respect to identification and evaluation of  
the appropriate level of protection, determination of prob-
abilities and damage, and related cost-benefit analysis   
of proposed protection measures existing studies are so far 
limited. 
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